Using individual-level data from three uniquely comparable surveys (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, English Longitudinal Study of Ageing and Health and Retirement Study) in Europe and the United States, as well as the World Bank's Doing Business data, this paper empirically zeroes in on the impact of start-up costs on the self-employment-wealth relationship. The longitudinal nature of the data enables us to investigate the potential effects of the last global financial crisis. Results confirm the strong positive relationship between the entrepreneurial choice and wealth as well as the negative effect that stems from the increase in start-up costs. Interestingly, although there is no strong evidence that wealth in itself played a bigger role during the crisis, we find that the negative impact of start-up costs on the entrepreneurship-wealth relationship proved to be significantly pronounced during the last crisis.
Introduction
While it seems that we live in an era of the cult of the entrepreneur, it is important to remember that institutional regulations such as the ease of getting credit, or the extent of start-up costs, might prevent some individuals from embarking on a new business venture. The decision to become an entrepreneur rather than a wage worker is of course an individual choice and is made on the basis of many considerations. In this paper, we however focus on how start-up costs could impinge on this occupational choice when individuals are already faced with important liquidity constraints. Start-up costs here should not be confused with the financial amount required to start a particular business project -which varies depending on the type of project. Instead, we refer to the fixed cost (in terms of administrative burdens) of meeting the regulatory requirements for setting up a limited liability company, in a given country for instance. In that sense, these entry costs 1 could be viewed as a disutility that stems from meeting these mandatory entry regulations. On the other hand, there is ample evidence suggesting that high start-up costs could be more detrimental to the entry of low-quality entrepreneurs as compared to highly trained or innovative entrepreneurs. 2 This has been explained, inter alia, by the relatively high expected returns associated with innovative entrepreneurship, as well as better opportunities to access external financing which help attenuate the administrative burdens. In general, entry costs by imposing a barrier and some sort of selection mechanism allow new entrants to capture potential future rents through a reallocation process. That being said, it still remains that these one-off costs incurred at the point of entrance create a disutility to the individual.
The question on whether or not financial constraints in itself influence the individual decision to turn entrepreneur has received much attention in the rapidly increasing literature on entrepreneurship. 3 If these constraints constitute a determinant factor, one should observe, other things being equal, that wealthier people are more likely to start new businesses. That seems to be the case as documented by the recent class of dynamic occupational choice models (see Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) for instance), as well as empirical contributions on the topic. Against this backdrop, how possibly could start-up costs affect the wealth-entrepreneurship relationship? Do the wealth and start-up costs effects vary with the business cycle? For instance, assuming that liquidity constraints are more severe during financial crises or economic downturns, should we expect the wealth and start-up costs effects on the individual decision to start a new venture, to be more pronounced during these times? These are the questions we address in this paper.
The definition of an entrepreneur is a controversial issue and can differ in some extent, depending on the particular questions one wishes to address (see Quadrini (2009) for a discussion on that matter). However, in empirical studies and particularly in the occupational choice literature, an entrepreneur is commonly identified as a self-employed person as opposed to an individual working for someone else. Given the nature of the questions addressed in this paper, we also follow this definition. Recent cross-country evidences report that self-employment expands during downturns (see Bosch and Maloney (2008) or Loayza and Rigolini (2011) for instance). Controlling for this effect through time-specific effects, we empirically investigate the possibility that individuals could in fact be less likely to start their own business during times of recessions or severe financial crises owing to the financing constraints inherent to these periods. More interestingly, we examine the joint effects of liquidity constraints and start-up costs, under these circumstances, on the choice to become selfemployed. Our focus is on the effects stemming from the recent global financial crisis. The latter was associated with a large and sudden decline in personal wealth and venture capital funding, on top of a severe tightening of credit to small businesses or start-ups. Although several policy sources report the detrimental effects the global crisis had on entrepreneurship as well as on small and medium businesses, quantitative and detailed empirical studies on the issue are still rather scarce. Using the United States Current Population Survey (CPS) data, Fairlie (2013) is the first to undertake a thorough analysis of the effects of the Great Recession on business creation. He finds among other things that home owners with higher local home prices were more likely to start new businesses. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined how the crisis might have influenced the joint effects of liquidity constraints and entry costs. This is unfortunate, considering the relevance of this question for start-up policies during credit crunches.
Our paper is related to the vast literature on the role of wealth for entrepreneurship entry in the presence of financing constraints (see Quadrini (2009) for a review of earlier studies). Start-up costs constitute another important element that could somehow affect the decision to start a new venture. Despite the evidence that they vary substantially across countries (see work by Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999) for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries), the issue has received relatively far less attention in the occupational choice literature. The idea that start-up costs might negatively impinge on the decision to become entrepreneur has already been developed in Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides Fonseca, LopezGarcia, and Pissarides (2001) . Introducing an occupational choice decision in a search and matching model, they show that start-up costs discourage entrepreneurship and decrease the level of employment in the economy. However, their focus is on the employment effects of start-up costs; so how the latter decrease the fraction of entrepreneurs in an economy without financial market imperfections is left unanswered. Rissman (2007) assesses the impact of start-up costs on employment transitions using a search framework of the labour market which allows for mobility between unemployment, self-employment and wage work. She finds a very small negative effect of business start-up costs on the steady state self-employment rate. In fact, as carefully pointed out in her paper, that result simply indicates that entry costs do not have a significant impact in an environment that completely abstracts from liquidity constraints. For a sample of European firms, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) show that high start-up costs hamper the creation of new firms, especially in sectors that should naturally have high entry rates. Yet, their interest is not on the individual occupational choice, and consequently they do not examine the role of wealth in the process. The closest work to our paper is the one by Fonseca, Michaud, and Sopraseuth (2007) which provides interesting insights into the interplay between liquidity constraints and start-up costs and its implications for the occupational choice. Using a dynamic occupational choice model, they document a positive relationship between the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy and the level of wealth at equilibrium, but more interestingly, find that this relationship flattens out with the introduction of start-up costs. The reason is that, entry costs-being a sort of disutility-decrease the marginal value of wealth under liquidity constraints, thus making it even more important for the entrepreneurship decision. We refer to this negative impact of start-up costs, as the "start-up costs hypothesis." This theoretical prediction is supported by the empirical estimation conducted in their paper.
Our study differs from theirs in investigating the joint effects of wealth and start-up costs in a dynamic context, with a focus on the 2007-2010 financial crisis. To do so, we use several waves of individual-level data as well as new institutional data on start-up costs. The individual-level data come from three sibling surveys which focus on people aged 50 and more: The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) in England and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US. Several interesting considerations related to the use of these surveys are worth mentioning: First, there is a high incidence of self-employment among the older population, which has been documented and explained in the literature (see for instance Quinn (1980); Hatfield (2015) or among others). In fact, existing empirical literature shows that self-employment significantly increases with age, and potential explanations for this fact can be found in previous labour market experience and wealth accumulation. For instance, Blanchflower (2004) using aggregated and disaggregated data across 70 countries -with a special focus on US and European countries (including those in our sample) -documents that the probability of being self-employed rises significantly with age and reaches a maximum at age 76 for the European Union 4 as a whole. For the US, there are a large number of papers documenting the positive self-employment-age relationship for the full age range. 5 Second and directly related to the importance of wealth for entry into self-employment, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) document that the average wealth of workers aged 50 and more who transition into self-employment is about $ 362,000, which is more than double the wealth of those aged between 16 and 60 (about $144,800 for the latter). Thus, it can be very informative and insightful to specifically study this population for the issue at stake. Furthermore, these surveys are unique in providing directly comparable key and timely variables (especially the wealth and labour market variables in our case) across several European countries and the US, which is crucial to address our empirical questions. The country-level (institutional) data are mainly a product of the World Bank's Doing Business Project. The longitudinal nature of the data enables us to exploit time variation in effects in order to investigate the influence of the 2008-2010 global financial crisis.
Estimation results validate the start-up cost hypothesis. That is, there is a strong positive relationship between the propensity to become self-employed and personal wealth; yet start-up costs tend to weaken this relationship. What this suggests is that the marginal value of wealth is attenuated under liquidity constraints, in countries with bigger start-up costs. To put it another way, entry costs constitute an additional burden that makes wealth even more important in the presence of financing constraints. More interestingly, we find evidence that the negative impact of start-up costs is not a non-varying phenomenon, but rather presents an important "dynamic" component. In particular, while wealth in itself does not seem to play a bigger role during the crisis, we document that the negative impact of start-up costs on the self-employment-wealth relationship proves to be significantly pronounced during the crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a succinct discussion on the importance of liquidity constraints in the entrepreneurship literature. Section 3 briefly summarizes the theoretical basis of the empirical work we undertake in this paper. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5, we present our econometric strategy. Section 6 discusses the results and we conclude in Section 7.
Liquidity Constraints and Entrepreneurship in the Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that evaluates the impact of start-up costs on the entrepreneurship-wealth relationship during a financial crisis. However, it is worth mentioning that the contribution and argumentation in our paper hinge on the premise that liquidity constraints constitute a major factor in the individual decision to become entrepreneur. Thus, it might be useful to provide a background discussion on how this particular question has evolved in the literature. A very large number of studies have investigated the implications of liquidity constraints for the occupational choice decision. The objective of this section is not to provide an exhaustive review of this literature, but rather to highlight key and relatively recent papers that capture the gist and current state of the issue.
One of the pioneering works on the topic is the well-known study by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) . In an estimated static occupational choice framework under liquidity constraints, where individuals can choose between self-employment and wage work, they show that there exists a minimum level of wealth above which individuals choose to become entrepreneur. In their model, the liquidity constraint is introduced through a parameter that restricts the amount of capital that an individual is able to borrow and which is directly proportional to his wealth. They document that this financial constraint not only deters a substantial proportion of the population from trying entrepreneurship, but also induces a sub-optimal investment capital for those who succeed to enter the pool, thus reducing the total amount of capital flowing to entrepreneurship. The validity of this hypothesis has further been questioned by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) who find that the positive relationship between wealth and entry into entrepreneurship -documented in many other empirical studies -holds only at the top of the wealth distribution, thus it cannot be regarded as an implication of borrowing constraints. However, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) clearly show through their rich occupational choice model that Hurst and Lusardi's result is in fact not inconsistent with the view that entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained, and that modelling and taking into account dynamic considerations is key to understanding the importance of wealth for the entrepreneurial decision. Their model has been able to reproduce very well key empirical observations, including the wealth distribution in the data, and a version of it has been used by Basseto et al. (2015) to study the effects of credit shocks on the production sector and firm dynamics. One of the key results found in that latter paper is that the extent to which a financial shock erodes entrepreneurial wealth appears to be crucial in determining the speed of recovery of the real activity, which is fuelled by entrepreneurs. This finding is another evidence on how important is wealth for entry into entrepreneurship, especially following a credit crunch scenario.
One of the key challenges faced by empirical studies attempting to clearly identify causal effects of wealth on entrepreneurship is the potential endogeneity of the wealth variable. In fact, there is ample evidence that entrepreneurs accumulate more wealth than others (see Quadrini (1999) for instance). For that reason, a number of papers have elected to investigate more exogenous components of wealth, in an attempt to tackle the problem. Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) extensively revisit that literature and the central question both at the theoretical and at the empirical level. Overall, their results are very consistent with the existence of liquidity constraints, making wealth a key factor in the entrepreneurial decision. Interestingly, they show that the job displacement status of individuals plays a significant role in accounting for the finding by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) that the business entry rate exhibits a flat slope throughout most of the wealth distribution. In fact, a disaggregated analysis -clearly separating the sample into job losers and non-losers -appears to restore the positive relationship between wealth and entry into self-employment, commonly found in the literature. They also conduct a Monte Carlo exercise based on a dynamic version of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) model, in addition to exploiting changes in housing equity, to confirm the validity of the liquidity constraint hypothesis. Another interesting study is the one by Bates, Lofstrom, and Parker (2014) who find high levels of personal wealth to be essential for entry into high-barrier industries -that is, those intensive in either financial capital or owner education.
More recent and notable papers on the topic include those by Corradin and Popov (2015) , Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015) , Bloemen et al. (2016), and Frid et al. (2016) . Corradin and Popov (2015) exploit the exogenous variation in home equity for a large sample of US households over the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , and find that the probability of starting a new business is strongly correlated with housing wealth. Specifically, a 10% increase in home equity is found to raise the share of individuals becoming self-employed each year by above 1%. Along similar lines, Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015) emphasize the role of collateral lending channel in entrepreneurial entry. Their estimates suggest that the rise of housing prices in US between 2002 and 2007 allowed individuals to start small businesses by increasing access to collateral. In addition, they document that small ventures experiencing increases in housing prices had stronger growth in employment than large firms in the same areas and industries.
For their part, Bloemen et al. (2016) use a large sample from administrative data for the Netherlands and investigate the effects of the 2006 pension policy reform on transitions into self-employment. They estimate that an average reduction of net future pension wealth by 16,000 euros has a significantly negative effect on entrepreneurship, reducing the transition rate by 38%. Their study is particularly interesting because it identifies pension wealth as an important wealth component to which workers react.
Finally, the study by Frid et al. (2016) , using the US Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (PSED II), directly investigates the relationship between the personal wealth of business founders and their ability to access external financing during the business creation process. They find that low-wealth entrepreneurs are less likely to get external funds and receive much lower amounts when they do. One of the originalities of their paper is the fact that they directly measure liquidity constraints in the context of business creation, that is prior to the creation of a new venture.
Clearly it appears that, results from the recent literature are consistent with a positive wealthentrepreneurship relationship, confirming the central importance of wealth for the decision to become entrepreneur. In the next section, we outline for completeness' sake the theoretical underpinning of our paper, which is borrowed from the study by Fonseca, Michaud, and Sopraseuth (2007) regarding the interaction effects of liquidity constraints and start-up costs on the individual occupational decision.
Theoretical Foundation
The empirical work conducted in this paper is, in substance, a test of the start-up cost hypothesis. Therefore, it is worth recalling the mechanism behind this hypothesis. 6 The latter stipulates that wealthier people are more likely to become entrepreneur in the presence of liquidity constraints; yet this advantage provided by wealth is attenuated by start-up costs. This insight is derived from a dynamic occupational choice equilibrium model, where individuals, at the beginning of each period, choose to become entrepreneur, a wage worker or stay in non-employment (including retirement or labour market exit), by comparing the value functions of each occupational option. These value functions result from optimization problems and depend on the individual's wealth, his entrepreneurial ability as well as his ability as a (wage) worker.
Using conventional notations, let ( , , ),, ( , , ), ( , , ) and ( , , ), respectively, be the optimal value function of the individual, the value function of an entrepreneur, the worker's function and the one belonging to an inactive individual. The individual's state variables are his current assets (wealth) , his working ability and his entrepreneurial ability . In order to enter entrepreneurship, individuals might pay some one-off costs. We denote these start-up costs as̃wherẽ∈ {0, }, with > 0. These entry costs are captured in terms of utility loss, since they are mainly administrative burdens that people must go through before starting a new venture. The occupational choice decision is then defined by:
That is to say, the individual optimally decides the occupational option which will provide him with the highest utility (value function) and based on his known abilities as an entrepreneur and a wage worker, as well as the social security benefits of inactivity (non-employment). Fonseca, Michaud, and Sopraseuth (2007) show that there exists a minimum level of wealth beyond which individuals choose to become entrepreneur in the absence of start-up costs (̃= 0). However, after the introduction of start-up costs in the resolution (̃= ), the threshold level increases because these administrative burdens shift downward the expected utility of entrepreneurship. To put it differently, start-up costs decrease the marginal value of wealth under liquidity constraints, making the role of wealth even more important. As a result, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy decreases since the wealth requirement becomes more severe.
To sum up, the start-up cost hypothesis can be split into two parts: First, it suggests the existence of a positive relationship between the propensity to become entrepreneur and personal wealth. Second and more interestingly, the slope of this relationship tends to flatten as the size of start-up costs increases. Besides, this attenuation effect caused by the entry costs tends to be more pronounced in the middle of the wealth distribution, while on the other hand, the slope seems to be intact at the top -which can be rationalized by the high level of wealth, preventing individuals at the top from feeling the negative impact of start-up costs.
Data and Descriptive Analysis
The analysis is based on cross-country data from various sources and at different periods of time. We distinguish between individual-level data and country-level institutional data.
Individual Data
These data come from three longitudinal surveys: The SHARE, the ELSA in England and the HRS in the US. They focus on individuals aged 50 and over, provide comparable information and can be used for various analyses. Detailed information on health, socio-economic status and family networks are available in these studies. The SHARE is the last (of the three) to be established and its development closely follows its sibling studies. We use the first four (4) 6 (2012) . Likewise, we exploit the HRS waves 7 (2004), 8 (2006), 9 (2008), 10 (2010) and 11 (in 2012) . 8 Our analysis is exclusively based on respondents between 50 and 80 years old. This choice is motivated by the fact that few people are on the labour market after 80.
We essentially use three categories of variables from these surveys: the demographic variables, the labour market status and the household wealth. Demographic variables include gender, education, marital status, age, household size and health status. Two levels of education are considered: Highly educated individuals and the others. Highly educated are college graduates and over. We lump low-and middle-educated individuals together. Household size is the number of people in the household. As for the self-reported health status, three categories are retained: very good health, good health and fair/poor health. The marital status is whether the respondent is currently married or not. The labour market status and the household wealth constitute together with the institutional variables our main variables of interest. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for selected variables. With regard to the labour market status, we allow for three options: self-employed, wage workers and nonworking people. A self-employed 9 in our analysis is someone who reports being self-employed and making a living only from that activity. In other words, we exclude those who declare being self-employed but not receiving earnings from it, and those who are self-employed but also hold a wage work in addition. Although this is a broad definition of entrepreneurship, it certainly includes people who possess and manage businesses -regardless of whether they are own-account workers or employers. Besides, self-employment as a measure of entrepreneurship is commonly used in the occupational choice literature, especially in empirical studies (as discussed in Quadrini (2009) ). Non-working population include retired, unemployed and disabled (sick) respondents. Table 2 displays the percentage of individuals in each group, by country. Source: Authors' calculations using data from SHARE, ELSA and HRS. The unit is percentage (%). Computed statistics are weighted based on sampling weights and concern the population aged 50-80 and the years 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 . The self-employment rate is defined as the percentage of self-employed over the working population.
The percentage of respondents in the non-working population is remarkably important in all countries. This is not surprising given this group includes different sorts of people (retired, unemployed, disabled and sick). It can also be explained in some extent by the age characteristics of our sample (50-to 80-year-old individuals). The share of self-employed is reasonably and unsurprisingly low. However, it also varies substantially across countries -from 3.34% in Austria to 13.19% in Greece. The latter is well known to have a high self-employment rate (in fact, one of the highest in Europe for many years 10 ). This is also confirmed in our selected sample of older people. The last column of Table 1 reports the self-employment rate for the group. It is computed as the percentage of self-employed individuals over the working population. The figures are higher if compared to statistics for the whole working population (regardless of age), which is consistent with the documented fact that self-employment increases with age. Now, let us turn our attention to the second variable of interest: the household wealth. We use the net current wealth reported by individuals in the surveys. It is defined as the sum of the net value of housing, stocks, bonds, saving accounts, private retirement accounts and other annuities minus all debts the household may have. Wealth figures are all converted in Euros and adjusted for purchasing power parity, using OECD values. By doing this computation, we make the respondents' figures easily comparable across countries. It is important to note that the wealth variable is not ex ante (prior to employment transitions) but rather an estimation of (current) wealth at the time of the survey. Ideally, an ex ante measure would suit best the econometric analysis we undertake (next section) to test the validity of the start-up costs hypothesis. However, we show that a bias (if any at all) is very likely to be insignificant. Table 3 gives a glimpse of the repartition across wealth classes, by labour force status. We can notice that contrary to wage workers and non-working people who are more or less equally distributed across wealth classes, most of self-employed in our sample clearly belong to top classes (quantiles 4 and 5). In fact, 62.41% of self-employed belong to quantiles 4 and 5, while only 47.50% of workers and 41.83% of non-working belong to these top wealth classes. Although this does not necessarily mean that wealth is important for entrepreneurship entry, it does provide positive information in this direction. Figure 1 shows the distributions of self-employed and (wage) workers over wealth decile classes, for the five waves (periods) in our sample. As can be seen, the self-employed are disproportionately concentrated in the top classes (deciles 9 and 10) throughout the waves. Behind this general picture, there are some different configurations across countries. We report in Appendix A selected country figures. For instance, the concentration of self-employed at the top of the wealth distribution is strikingly apparent in the Netherlands' case. 
Institutional Data
We are interested in measuring the start-up costs at the country level. To do so, we take advantage of a set of indicators provided by the World Bank's Doing Business Project.The latter was launched in 2002 and makes available objective and comparable measures of business regulations and their enforcement across many countries and selected cities over time. In order to exploit the maximum variability in the indicators, we use factor analysis procedure to construct a score 11 as a proxy for start-up costs at the country level. Factor analysis is often used for data reduction purposes. It can help to get a small set of variables (preferably uncorrelated) from a large set of variables (most of which are correlated to each other). Another purpose is to create indexes with variables that conceptually measure similar things. This last purpose serves precisely our needs.
Three institutional measures are used to compute the start-up cost index. The first is the total number of days required to register a business. It captures the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete a procedure with minimum follow-up with government agencies and no extra payments. The second is a cost measure, expressed as a percentage of the country's income per capita. It includes all official fees and fees for legal or professional services if such services are required by law. The third is also expressed in percentage of income per capita and measures the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation. Figure 2 plots the relationship between the constructed index -using principal component factoring -and the self-employment rates across the countries of our sample. The self-employment country figures are computed as the percentage of self-employed individuals over the working group (self-employed and salaried workers). We also report in Appendix A a summary table including the corresponding figures for each of the three components of administrative burdens used to compute the start-up cost index (Table 8) Figure 2 seems to depict a positive correlation between self-employment rates and the size of start-up costs at the country level. In other words, countries where start-up costs are higher tend also to be the ones with the larger share of self-employed workers. The highest rates of self-employment are found in Greece, where approximately 40% of the workers are self-employed. It is followed by the two other Southern European countries (Italy and Spain). The rest of the countries have generally modest self-employment statistics and relatively low start-up costs. They are concentrated around the lower end of the fitted line. This positive correlation between start-up costs and self-employment rates may appear a priori counterintuitive. However, this does not tell us much about how the entry costs impact individuals' choices under liquidity constraints. In fact, we argue that the effects of start-up costs on entrepreneurship entry makes more sense in a financially constrained environment; therefore they should be accurately assessed through its influence on the wealth-entrepreneurship relationship. A positive (negative) correlation between self-employment and start-up costs only tells us that self-employed individuals are more (less) likely to be in countries with more cumbersome entry costs. Yet, this gives us no information on the underlying mechanisms through which these costs operate at the individual level. The pattern shown in Figure 2 is therefore another motivation to delve into the matter more deeply. We examine this issue in the next section.
Apart from our institutional variable of interest (the start-up cost measure), we also control for three other country-level regulation measures: the ease of getting credit, a "tax" variable and the net pension replacement rates. As with the start-up cost index, the ease of getting credit is computed using principal component factoring. To do so, another set of World Bank's Doing Business indicators 12 are used: the strength of legal rights index, the depth of credit information index, the credit registry coverage and the credit bureau coverage. The legal rights index ranges from 0 to 12 and measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. Higher scores indicate that the laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The depth of credit information index measures the rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a credit bureau or credit registry. Likewise, higher scores mean better access to credit. The credit registry coverage reports the number (expressed as a percentage of the adult population) of individuals and firms listed in a credit registry's database. Finally, the credit bureau coverage reports the number of individuals and firms, now listed in a credit bureau database (see World Bank's Doing Business Project for further details).
The "tax" variable measures the total amount of taxes and mandatory contributions borne by the business in the second year of operation. It is expressed as a share of commercial profit and is designed to provide a comprehensive measure of the cost of all the taxes a business bears. Note that it differs from the statutory rate which merely provides the factor to be applied to the tax base. The third institutional variable is the net pension replacement ratio. Since our analysis is based on people aged 50 and more, it is important to control for the impact of the pension regulations at the country level on the individual occupational choice. The replacement rates are defined as the net pension entitlement as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings. We use OECD figures for an average single man earner. 
Econometric Strategy
The start-up cost hypothesis stipulates that wealthier people are more likely to become entrepreneur in the presence of liquidity constraints; yet this advantage provided by wealth is attenuated by start-up costs. The latter act as a disutility and increase the threshold level of wealth that is necessary to start an own business. It is important to understand that it is not the "monetary value" of start-up costs which is at stake here, but instead the harmful effects associated with the process of meeting the administrative regulations.
The Baseline Model
Our strategy is to exploit the variation in start-up costs across countries (and periods) to identify how they affect the relation between the propensity to become self-employed and wealth. Although our main interest is to investigate the potential impact of the global financial crisis on the start-up costs effect, we begin by examining a baseline specification. Consistently with the categorization adopted in the previous section, we allow for three options for the dependent variable (the occupational choice): self-employed, wage worker and non-worker. A non-linear functional form is used as proxy for wealth since the wealth effects are most unlikely to be linear. Thus, we choose to use quintile dummies for net wealth. The model can be written as:
where , represents the occupational choice m of the individual i in country j at time t, m taking the values 0, 1 and 2, respectively, for "non-worker," "wage worker" and "self-employed";
, takes the value 1 if the individual's net wealth in country j at time t is in the th quantile of the overall wealth distribution. The first quintile ( = 1) is omitted because of the constant parameter in the specification.
, denotes our measure of start-up costs. and denote, respectively, country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects; , represents the error term which is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. , is a vector of control variables (including the constant parameter). The control variables include individual demographic characteristics and country-level regulation measures.
To be specific, the demographic variables which we control for are the individual's age (and the age squared -to capture non-linearity in the age effects), his (her) gender, his (her) level of education (highly educated or not), his (her) marital status, the household size and health status. We also add an interaction term between the level of education and our measure of start-up costs, to capture the fact that the fraction of entrepreneurs in a specific country could depend on the share of highly educated people in this country. Another motivation for the inclusion of this interaction term is that the level of entry costs might impinge on the type (or quality) of entrepreneurship. For instance, Monteiro and Assuncao (2012), Branstetter et al. (2013) , and Rostam-Afschar (2013) find that low start-up regulations lead to the entry of low-ability entrepreneurs who are mainly active in low-tech industries (e.g. retailing businesses). In the same vein, Block et al. (2015) argue that start-up costs impose a selection effect and increase the likelihood of innovative entrepreneurship in a country. Thus, by including the interaction term between start-up costs and the level of education, we are explicitly controlling for the relationship that might exist between individual ability (proxied by education), the extent of start-up costs and the propensity to be self-employed.
Since we exploit cross-country variation in start-up costs to investigate the individual decision to become self-employed, we cannot disregard the role of country institutional, cultural or historical factors in explaining entry into entrepreneurship. That is important because the prevalence of self-employment varies widely across countries. For instance, it is quite higher in Southern Europe than in Northern Europe. While the vast majority of studies on self-employment and the role of institutions are country specific, there are a number of papers such as Carrasco and Ejrnaes (2003) , Hatfield (2015) , Zissimopoulos, Maestas, and Karoly (2007) , and Torrini (2005) that have analysed the issue in an international context. Carrasco and Ejrnaes (2003) focus on two European countries (Spain and Denmark) and examine institutional factors such as the generosity of unemployment benefits systems, childcare policies and labour market flexibility among others. Hatfield (2015) uses the SHARE data and investigates the issue for ten European countries, while Zissimopoulos, Maestas, and Karoly (2007) focus on institutional differences between the UK and US, based on the HRS and ELSA data. It comes out from these three studies that factors, such as the generosity of unemployment benefits, pension systems and the flexibility of labour markets, matter significantly for cross-country variation in self-employment rates. Besides, the study by Torrini (2005) finds taxation to play a major role in explaining large disparities in self-employment across OECD countries. The relatively recent paper by Christelis and Fonseca (2015) using data from SHARE, ELSA and HRS provides a good overview of the role of various institutional and labour market policies in explaining transitions in and out of self-employment of older workers.
In this paper, our main focus is on the role of individual's wealth and start-up costs -as a country regulation -on the decision to become self-employed. The only way institutional differences across countries could affect our results is when they are not taken into account but happen to be significantly correlated to indvidual's wealth or the measure of start-up costs. While it is not clear how and to what extent country-level institutions could influence accumulation of wealth at the individual level, we cannot rule out the fact that administrative burdens to start a new business might be correlated in some ways with the general institutional environment of a country. Thus, we do control for relevant time-variant institutional measures such as the ease of access to credit, the business taxation and the pension systems (replacement ratios). More importantly, we include in all our specifications country-fixed effects that capture all unobservable and non-measurable country-specific institutional or cultural differences in self-employment rates. The country-fixed effects are evidently allowed to be correlated with our main variables of interest.
Let us now examine eq. (1). For the start-up cost hypothesis to be validated, we should have 5,2 > 4,2 > 3,2 > 2,2 > 1,2 > 0 and ,2 < 0. In other words, there exists a positive relationship between entrepreneurship and wealth (individuals belonging to wealthier quantiles are relatively more likely to be entrepreneur), but the slope of this relationship flattens with the magnitude of start-up costs at the country level. Another interpretation is that the marginal value of wealth (for entrepreneurship entry) is decreased in countries with more substantial start-up costs. The inclusion of time-fixed effects ensures that any cyclical effects of entrepreneurship entry in itself are taken into account.
The Augmented Specifications
Next, we turn our attention to the potential effects of the global financial crisis. We acknowledge that the identification of these effects is an extremely challenging task, even more considering the international dimension of our sample. As we previously discussed in Section 2, recent studies which have attempted to identify causal effects of wealth on entrepreneurship have done so by exploiting policy reforms or wealth shocks in the context of one single country. While the wealth-entrepreneurship relationship is fundamental to our exercise, our main interest is on how the slope of this relationship is affected by the extent of start-up costs. Since we do not directly observe wealth shocks in our data, the strategy here is to exploit the timing of the global crisis to capture indirectly its effects. We cannot however claim to fully single out the crisis effects, although the time variation in marginal effects should provide us with interesting insights in this regard. In particular, we assume that ceteris paribus, the effects of the crisis (if any at all) should be more pronounced in 2008. In fact, although the crisis officially started in the second half of 2007, 2008 was the "year of disaster." However, because 2008 individual data are only available for two countries (US and England), the year 2010 is our period of particular interest to capture the crisis effects.
In order to investigate whether wealth played a bigger role for entrepreneurship entry during the crisis, we estimate the following equation, where the notations are unchanged. 
The difference between eqs. (1) and (2) is the third term in the right-hand side of eq. (2): the interaction terms between wealth quintiles and period indicators. Special attention will be put on the parameters ,2 , which will tell us how different are the slopes of the self-employment-wealth relationship across the periods. If the financial crisis made it particularly difficult for individuals to start a new venture because of more severe liquidity constraints, wealth should play a bigger role during 2010 (compared to the periods 2004, 2006 and 2012) . If that appears to be the case, we should expect the 2010 interaction parameters to be significantly greater than the others (2004, 2006 and 2012) , for individuals belonging to top wealth classes (quantiles 4 and 5), but lower for those belonging to bottom wealth classes (quantiles 1 to 3). In other words, every other things being equal, wealthier people should be the ones more able to start a new venture during the crisis because of the occurring severe liquidity constraints. On the other hand, individuals at the bottom of the wealth distribution should be less likely to be entrepreneurs in 2010 compared to the other years. Keep also in mind that the inter-period comparison is made independently for each wealth (quantile) class. Finally, we examine whether the influence of start-up costs on the wealth-entrepreneurship relationship is different across the periods. This is implemented by adding to the previous specification (2) interaction terms of wealth, start-up costs and period indicators. That is, by estimating:
The parameters of special interest in this full specification are the ,2 on the interaction terms of wealth, start-up costs and period dummies. They tell us if the negative impact of start-up costs on the self-employmentwealth relationship varies with the periods. In particular, we examine whether the joint effect of start-up costs and liquidity constraints is (significantly) more severe during 2010 compared to the other periods. Remark that we still control for the non-dynamic impact of start-up costs, as well as the (stand-alone) dynamic effect of wealth -that is, the third term in the right-hand side of eq. (2).
We implement a multinomial logit estimation for all our equations of interest. Because there is no natural baseline (comparison) outcome, we choose, respectively, non-worker and worker as baseline outcomes. The first because it represents the most frequent outcome and also due to the age feature of our sample (older people). The second choice is to facilitate interpretation of entrepreneurship entry in direct comparison with wage work. We discuss all the estimation findings in the next section.
Estimation Results
We first present results from testing the (benchmark) start-up cost hypothesis (eq. (1)). Then, we discuss the crisis estimation results. All the estimation tables report marginal effects (instead of simple coefficients). The models generally fit well the data as shown by the pseudo-2 . Although we report outcome results for both selfemployed and workers with the aim of highlighting the differences, our main interest and discussion are on the former (predicted outcome: self-employed). In our multinomial estimation setting, two baseline outcomes (non-worker and wage worker) are relevant and valid options for the investigation. However, given the "nonworker" outcome is the most frequently occurring status -which is essentially explained by our sample of individuals aged 50 and more -the natural (and most relevant) baseline outcome would be the "non-worker" status. Thus, our main results reported below are obtained using this outcome as point of reference. 13 Table 5 shows the results from estimating (1) taking "nonworker" as the baseline outcome. Results confirm the positive relationship between self-employment and wealth (for all quintiles). That is, there exists a certain hierarchy in the marginal effects of wealth (as should be expected): individuals in the fifth quantile (the wealthiest) are relatively more likely than any other one to become self-employed compared to non-worker; those in the fourth quantile (Q4) are relatively more likely than others in poorer quantiles, and so on. Notice for instance that this is not true for the wage workers: Especially, since the parameter on the fifth quintile is not significantly different of zero, that means that both individuals at the bottom and at the top of the wealth distribution have the same relative propensity to become self-employed. The estimated positive relationship between self-employment and wealth is necessary but not sufficient to validate the start-up cost hypothesis. We also need to look at the sign of the quintile interaction terms with start-up costs. With the exception of the fifth quintile, all others' interactions with start-up costs are significantly negative. Interestingly enough, the marginal effects are more pronounced in the middle of the wealth distribution (quantile 3 and quantile 4). The fact that the start-up costs' effects are found to be absent at the top of the wealth distribution is simply because the wealthiest are very unlikely to feel the burden of entry costs. In particular, our empirical results show that the marginal effect of wealth on the relative probability to be self-employed is smaller in countries with more substantial start-up costs (or when these costs become bigger within a country). In fact, depending on the wealth class of individuals (and/or the extent of start-up costs), some people could well find it difficult to enter entrepreneurship. The reason is that these costs decrease the marginal value of wealth under liquidity constraints.
Testing the Start-up Costs Hypothesis: The Baseline Specification
The estimated (direct) marginal effect of start-up costs on the relative probability to become self-employed is found to be significantly positive (at the 10% level). Note however, that this is not a robust 14 result throughout all our specifications. That is, other things being equal, individuals are relatively more likely to become selfemployed in countries with bigger start-up costs. Recall that we find a similar correlation when describing the data in Section 3 (Figure 2) . We emphasize the fact that this finding is not inconsistent with the start-up cost hypothesis. A positive (or negative for that matter) relationship between the relative propensity to become entrepreneur and start-up costs is in itself not that informative. What really matters is the fact that these entry regulations soften the marginal value of wealth under liquidity constraints, thereby constituting an additional burden to overcome. If the aspiring entrepreneur is wealthy enough, start-up costs should not deter him from his purpose. Otherwise, he might be discouraged by the costly entry regulations. Therefore, it is important to examine the significativity of the interaction variable between wealth and start-up costs, while controlling for the direct effect of these entry costs. In our case, although data do not suggest a clear evidence regarding the direct relationship between entry into self-employment and the extent of start-up costs, the evidence on the influence of the latter on the wealth-entrepreneurship nexus is clearly robust. Estimated coefficients are marginal effects at mean. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote, respectively, the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
As discussed earlier in the paper, the wealth variable used to undertake the analysis is not ex ante, but rather a measure of wealth at the time of the survey -that is current wealth. Therefore, one may think that the estimated marginal effects of wealth are biased because of the endogeneity of this variable. 15 We use current wealth as proxy for ex ante wealth. However, as a robustness check, we reestimate eq. (1), using the previous period/wave's wealth as our indicator. The results in Table 101 in Appendix C (using previous period's wealth measure) should be compared to those reported in Table 5 . As can be seen, the findings are generally the same. Besides, although it is true that many other observable and unobservable factors are likely to influence the occupational choice, our focus and interest in this paper is on the role of start-up costs (as an institution). Since these entry regulations are measured at the country level, we should not expect any bias on their impact on the self-employment-wealth relationship.
Augmented Specifications: Impacts of the Global Crisis
Without further ado, we now examine how the global financial crisis might have impinged on the occupational choice decision through its effects on wealth and start-up costs. We report in Table 6 the results from estimating eq. (2). For the sake of readability, we only show here the estimation parameters of the key variables of interest. Note that 2004 is the omitted (reference) year. The negative impact of entry costs on the self-employmentwealth relationship is still present. We can, however, notice that almost none of the interaction parameters between wealth quintiles and year indicators is significant. In particular, the 2010 interaction terms do not seem to significantly differ from those of the 2004, 2006 and 2012 periods, and this holds for individuals in all wealth classes. What this suggests is that there was no particular impact of the crisis on the wealth-entrepreneurship relationship. But what about the negative impact of start-up costs on this relationship? Is there any "dynamic" pattern in this regard? 
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Estimated coefficients are marginal effects at mean. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote, respectively, the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Year 2004 is the omitted (benchmark comparison) period. Table 7 displays the results from the estimation of eq. (3): the full dynamic specification. 16 An interesting pattern emerges. The year 2010 interaction terms with start-up costs and wealth quintiles (3, 4 and 5) become significantly negative (estimated marginal effects of −0.023, −0.015 and −0.022), respectively, at the 1%, 10% and 1% significance level. Recall that the inter-period comparison is made within each wealth class and also that the year 2004 is the omitted benchmark comparison period in our estimations. For instance, if we consider individuals belonging to the wealth quantile 3 (those in the middle of the distribution), and taking into account that the estimated interaction coefficient of Q3 with start-up costs (SC) and year 2006 is also significantly negative (−0.019 at the 1% level), our estimated parameter of −0.023 (for the 2010 interaction term) suggests that entry costs exert a more pronounced negative impact on the propensity of those individuals to become self-employed in 2010 compared to the periods 2004, 2006 and 2012. That is the case for individuals in the fourth quantile, and even those at the top of the wealth distribution (fifth quantile). Because we exploit time variation to capture the crisis effects, these findings can be interpreted this way: Although the global crisis had not made wealthier people particularly more likely to start a new venture, it seems to have a negative impact on the propensity to become self-employed, when the occurring severe liquidity constraints that took place during that period are coupled with the additional burden of start-up costs. Interestingly enough, we also find that the "non-dynamic" effects of start-up costs (the wealth quintile interaction terms with start-up costs) become insignificant once we introduce the "dynamic" effects (interactions with period indicators). This result highlights the fact that the joint effects of liquidity constraints and start-up costs on the propensity to become self-employed have an important "dynamic" component, and thus are likely to vary with the business cycle, especially when credit market imperfections become severe, as was the case during the recent global crisis. Year 2004 is the omitted (benchmark comparison) period. We still control for the non-dynamic effects of SC on wealth quintiles, and they turn out to be all insignificant for the entrepreneurs predicted outcome. They are omitted from the table for the sake of readability.
A few words can be said regarding our control variables. With respect to the socio-demographic variables, the results are generally consistent with what has been documented in many other empirical studies in the occupational choice literature. For instance, highly educated individuals and men are relatively more likely to be self-employed, while married persons are found to be less inclined to become so. Since our target population is people aged 50 and more, the entrepreneurship-age profile has an inverted U-shape, which is consistent with the fact that self-employment increases with age, but at the same time, highlights the evidence that the non-employment population is rather preponderant (compared to entrepreneurs) after an advanced age. We do not find significant evidence that higher start-up costs are associated with higher quality (or innovative) entrepreneurship. Recall that we capture this possibility by introducing an interaction term between start-up costs and education (a proxy for ability). This result is somehow consistent with the ambiguity that exists in this regard in the literature. In fact, it has also been argued that low start-up costs may lead to the entry of high-quality entrepreneurs because lower costs are associated with more dynamic markets and lower levels of corruption (see Djankov et al. 2002 or De Soto 1989 . As for the institutional control variables, we find that better access to credit has a positive effect on the relative propensity to become self-employed. However, the tax regulations and the replacement ratio configurations do not appear to play a significant role in the occupational choice decision.
Conclusion
Recent theoretical work and empirical evidence show that institutional factors such as the extent of liquidity constraints and start-up costs significantly influence the individual decision to become self-employed. This paper takes advantage of new data to further explore this issue. Our interest has been on the joint effect of liquidity constraints and start-up costs on the propensity of individuals to start their own business. We refer to this effect -previously documented in the literature at the theoretical level -as the start-up cost hypothesis. The idea is that wealthier individuals are more likely to become self-employed, yet start-up costs decrease the marginal value of wealth. As a result, there is an increase in the minimum level of wealth which is optimally required to start one's own business. We stress the fact that start-up costs in our sense need to be viewed as a disutility coming from the burdensome regulations that an aspiring entrepreneur has to comply with, before starting his (her) new venture. The longitudinal feature of our data has allowed us, in particular, to investigate the effects of the 2006-2010 global crisis. The latter has brought the issue of liquidity constraints to the forefront because of the large and rapid decline in personal wealth and venture capital funding, as well as the severe tightening of credit to small businesses, which took place. Given this unfavourable global economic and financial environment, one can imagine that wealth might play a bigger role for entrepreneurship entry, and that the marginal effects of start-up costs might be more pronounced.
A number of studies and policies reports have found that self-employment is very prevalent among the mature and older population. Besides other factors (such as labour market experience) which could explain this observation, the importance of wealth cannot be overstated. Thus, we have taken advantage of three uniquely harmonized surveys on people aged 50 and more across many European countries and the US, to address our research questions -where wealth plays a central role. We have documented a positive relationship between self-employment and wealth. More importantly, the start-up cost hypothesis is supported by our empirical analysis. Our identification strategy has been to exploit the timing of the crisis to capture its effects, while controlling for any specific period shocks or business cycle effects through the inclusion of time-fixed effects. We have not found strong evidence that wealth (in itself) had particularly played a bigger role during the crisis period (that is in 2010, compared to the periods before and after). However, results clearly show that the detrimental impacts of start-up costs -on the entrepreneurship-wealth relationship -had been more marked during the crisis. In other words, the addition of start-up costs to the liquidity constraints had been the main driver of the negative influence of the global crisis.We have acknowledged the difficulty and complexity of identifying the specific effects of the crisis, especially given the international dimension of our sample. Although we are confident that our strategy enables us to obtain significant insights into this regard, we cannot claim to completely single out the particular effects of the financial crisis. That is a limitation of our study.
While we cannot convincingly infer the results of our investigation to the whole population (that is, without regard to age), the fact that wealth is one of the main explanations for why self-employment is very common in the mature and older population should give a good motivation to better understand and recognize the full implications of the findings obtained in this paper. We believe that our results add important insights into the existing literature, regarding the role of administrative burdens in the start-up process and are naturally relevant for policy makers in the design of entrepreneurship policies. There are clearly several considerations that individuals make when taking the decision to start a business. Those include personal as well as institutional motivations. Understanding how institutional factors such as the extent of administrative burdens could impinge on the decision to become entrepreneur, especially in a financially constrained context or credit crunches scenarios, provides undeniably important insights into the development of policies to support the creation of new businesses and the private-sector dynamism. Estimated coefficients are marginal effects at mean. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote, respectively, the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Estimated coefficients are marginal effects at mean. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote, respectively, the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Year 2004 is the omitted (benchmark comparison) period. Year 2004 is the omitted (benchmark comparison) period. We still control for the non-dynamic effects of SC on wealth quintiles, and they turn out to be all insignificant for the entrepreneurs predicted outcome. They are omitted from the table for the sake of readability. 
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Estimated coefficients are marginal effects at mean. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote, respectively, the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Notes
15 Using current wealth instead of wealth at the moment of transitioning can be viewed to some extent as committing a measurement error on the true value of wealth (ex ante). In that particular case, our estimated effects should suffer from attenuation bias (downward bias). This bias is not a concern here because a correction would only strengthen our main results. Another source of endogeneity of the wealth variable is the reverse causality issue (simultaneity bias). That is, self-employment helping people to become wealthier. Although we cannot totally discard this possibility, one should nevertheless keep in mind that our measure of wealth is not an ex post measure neither; therefore the bias (if any at all) is most likely to be marginal. 16 We only report the key estimated interaction parameters of interest. Remaining estimates are available upon request.
